Jornadas de Ética

Jornadas de Ética
12 Abril 2019
Sala dos Conselhos / UBI


Programa 


09h30
Abertura

09h45  
Constantine Sandis (Univ. Hertfordshire)
Action, Duty, and Luck

10h45  
Rui Sampaio e Silva (Univ. Açores)
The Automaticity of Human Behaviour and the Intellectualist Bias in the Philosophy of Action

11h45 
Fernanda Henriques (UE/Labcom.IFP)
Seyla Benhabib: em torno da problemática do universalismo ético.

13h00 
Almoço

14h30 
Maria do Céu Patrão Neves (Univ. Açores)
Decisões em fim de vida: interpretações e equívocos

15h30 
José António Duarte Domingues (UBI/Labcom/IFP)
Da admissibilidade ética da morte voluntária



Constantine Sandis,"Action, Duty, and Luck"
This paper argues that theories of what makes an action right or justified are insufficiently concerned with questions in the philosophy of action. If I am right, this will hold true of  more conceptions of action and areas of moral discourse than I am able to address in a single paper. So while the reach of my most general argument is intended to be very wide, I shall proceed by focused discussions of individual debates in both action theory and ethics. I proceed by presenting a familiar distinction between the things we do and our acts of doing them before using a range of examples to demonstrate its relevance for normative ethics and moral epistemology. A particular case in point is the interminable debate between consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue-theorists on the potential relevance of person's motives and intentions to the rightness or wrongness of her acts, but I shall also discuss debates concerning moral luck and acting under uncertainty. My aim is to show why it is that a number of controversies ethical theory take on an entirely new shape once we disambiguate the two concepts of action in question, let alone fix their ontological detail.

Rui Sampaio da Silva,"The Automaticity of Human Behaviour and the Intellectualist Bias in the Philosophy of Action”
According to contemporary psychology and cognitive science, most of our actions, including morally relevant actions, are automatic and not consciously controlled. This pervasive automaticity of human behaviour challenges traditional views on responsibility and agency, and in particular intellectualist accounts of human action that emphasize the role of deliberation and conscious judgement. Habitual actions, being automatic and done without conscious reasons, do no fit an intellectualist model; on the other hand, recent empirical research has revealed the existence of automatic and unconscious mechanisms that have a significant causal influence on human behaviour. I argue that traditional methods of virtue acquisition can help us to reconcile automaticity with agency and responsibility, but they should be complemented by a deep knowledge of the nature of our automatic mind.

Support:
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
União Europeia
Quadro de Referência Estratégico Nacional
Programa Operacional Factores de Competitividade
Universidade da Beira Interior